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Abstract
For a sub-sample of  French  households  of  an  Insee  wealth  survey,  we obtain  new  and
relative  measures  of  5  individual  preference  parameters  :  the  risk  "attitude"  (aversion,
prudence…),  the  rate  of  time  depreciation  over  the  life-cycle,  the  degree  of  short-term
impatience, and the degrees of family and non family  altruism. Short-term  impatience  and non
family altruism are found no to affect wealth but, contrarily  to  recent  results  of  behavioural
analysis, the three other parameters have significant effects on wealth  (financial,  gross or  net),
which are consistent with theoretical predictions : wealth accumulation increases with the degree
of prudence (precautionary saving), falls with time preference (life-cycle saving) and rises with the
degree of family altruism (wealth intended for bequests). The way preferences are measured allows
to get rid of potential causality problems and the joint explanatory power of the  three  parameters
appears sizeable, although less  important  than  the  one  of  classic explanatory  variables (age,
income, social class and inheritance).
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To what extent does household wealth depend on circumstances and on choices? In
other words, to what extent are households "responsible" for their own level of saving? While
this question may seem overly general, and at least partly normative, it is behind a large body
of recent empirical literature, especially in North America.
1
Work in this area typically starts by asking a more precise, slightly different question :
can heterogeneity of individual preferences account for two major stylised facts concerning the
wealth distribution in the USA and France (as indeed in most  developed countries), facts
which are unexplained by the life-cycle theory :
- the very wide range of the wealth distribution, given age (and family structure) and
the level of resources (permanent income, or permanent wage and retirement income);
- the inadequacy of saving at retirement age of a substantial proportion of households,
especially compared to resources available over the life-cycle (which should imply a sharp
reduction in consumption at the end of life).
2
These two findings are now well established and seem unlikely to only result from
measurement error (which is nonetheless important in the measurement of wealth). The first
reflects the finding that age and permanent income together only explain a small part  of the
distribution of wealth: just over a third, according to the Theil index. The remaining dispersion
is indeed important for any age and decile of permanent income (or lifetime earnings) : at the
eve of retirement, we thus find a non-negligible proportion of savers in the first income deciles,
and an important percentage of non-savers in the top income deciles. The second stylised fact
develops this last point for the bottom of the wealth distribution : at the end of working life,
wealth is under two years of permanent income for over twenty per cent of households, and
this holds almost independently of the level of permanent income.
3
If these empirical observations are indeed correct, the  interpretation  given in  the
mentioned microeconomic literature is more problematic. These authors allow only a minor
role for capital and credit market imperfections (entry barriers, transaction or holding costs,
increasing returns to the size of investment, etc.), or again for distortions associated with
social security,  which  may  discourage small amounts  of  saving (Hubbard  et  al. 1995).
Similarly, they disregard the implications of buffer-stock models, which explain low levels of
wealth - for prudent consumers - by "impatience" (i.e. high time preference), together with
liquidity  or  borrowing  constraints  (Deaton,  1992),  or  with  private  or  public  insurance
imperfections (Caroll, 2001). And the fact of concentrating on wealth disparities at a given age
                                                
1 For example, Lusardi (2003) and Venti and Wise (2001) with American HRS panel data, or Ameriks, Caplin
and Leahy (2003) using TIAA-CREF data (covering participants in  a private pension program in  the USA).
Appendix 1 describes the ideological content of this approach.
2 These are not the only "puzzles" regarding wealth. Household portfolios are only little diversified (but differ
sharply between households) ; the demand for shares is indeed limited, despite the difference in returns between
stocks and shares (the "equity premium puzzle").
3 See Masson (1988) and Masson and Arrondel (1989) for France and Canada. Another statistic relating to the
same phenomenon of insufficient saving is that median wealth is low at all ages and for all permanent income








































and permanent income leads them to abstract from inheritances and differences in abilities
(which are supposedly reflected in inequalities in permanent income).
How can one then explain such differences in wealth at a given age and income ? The
previous authors have proposed a key role for preference heterogeneity, but not necessarily
that of a fully rational agent - in American data, time preference and risk-aversion have been
found to explain only little of the distribution of wealth
4. Following a "behavioural" approach,
they emphasise the potential role of limited rationality in explaining the low level of savings of
a number of households at retirement age : an insufficient propensity  to plan for the future
(too little time being devoted to retirement planning); lack of self-control (which prevents
individuals from following a simple saving plan); or time inconsistency, as shown by feelings
of regret at not having saved more (expressed by three-quarters of households in HRS data).
Do those who find themselves with insufficient saving at retirement age only  have
themselves to blame ? Lusardi (2004) indeed proposes savings and financial education training
"seminars" - to reduce the costs of financial planning and information. She suggests that such
a programme would be cost-effective, producing a non-negligible (20 to 30 %) rise in savings
by the low-educated.
Appendix 1 underlines the methodological and ideological issues raised by this recent
literature. Our own contribution to that debate is based on  a novel method of  estimating
individual preferences.
Using a series of different questions (regarding behaviour, opinion or intention, lottery
or hypothetical choice) covering a number of different domains (consumption, leisure, health,
financial investment, work, retirement, and family life), we construct synthetic scores for an
"experimental" sub-sample of individuals in the Insee survey "Patrimoine 1997". These scores
are argued to provide information regarding five different kinds of preferences :
- Two key parameters : g, the general attitude (rather than aversion) regarding risk ; and
d, the discount rate. These are extensions to the equivalent parameters in the standard life
cycle model (but see the [Theory] paper).
- Two parameters measuring intergenerational altruism, one familial, q, measuring the
weight given to children's well-being, and the other non-familial or social, q 
nf, showing the
weight given to future generations (protection of the environment, saving the planet, etc.).
- A composite indicator of short-term impatience, b, which may reflect an aversion for
waiting due to opportunity cost for a fully rational agent, or more likely the degree of time
inconsistency, corresponding to a lack of imagination or will (hyperbolic discounting). This
parameter reflects in part limited rationality, unlike the other four parameters.
                                                
4 See in particular Ameriks et al. (2003). However, the [Theory] paper underlines the potential unreliability,








































Our previous papers support the introduction of these five measures, suggest new
definitions of them, and, last, test empirically their empirical relevance
5. We consider now the
role that these five preference measures play in explaining the distribution of wealth (financial,
gross and net) observed in data from the 1997 French survey of Wealth (Patrimoine 1997).
6
As in previous work, we consider the effect of these measures conditional on other
variables, notably age and financial resources. The wealth equation implied by  the life-cycle
hypothesis suggests a role for all of the control variables, including the preference parameters :
wealth accumulation (financial or global) should increase with g (precautionary saving), fall
with d (life-cycle saving) and rise with q (wealth intended for bequests).
This paper brings a number of pieces of good news, which call into question some of
the results of recent behavioural analysis :
(i) The effect of the three preference scores g, d and q on wealth are significant and
consistent with the predictions (this is not the case of non-familial altruism with respect to
future generations). Moreover, the impatience parameter, b, does not affect wealth. These
conclusions are thus different from those found in American data, where insufficient wealth is
often explained by limited rationality.
7
(ii) The causality between wealth and preferences is a key issue : wealthier households
could be more far-sighted than others, for example. Our  method is  here very  useful : the
preference scores are constructed from  a  wide  variety  of  questions  covering multiple
dimensions of life (other than wealth) ; as such, these scores represent natural instruments,
whose exogeneity can be further checked.
(iii) The explanatory power of these preference parameters  (g, d and  q) remains
limited : but it comes just after the classic explanatory variables (age, income, social class, and
inheritance), and before other variables - social origin, education, household composition,
unemployment and health, etc. Moreover, those who have not saved ("enough") at retirement
age are found to have, on average, a higher discount rate and a lower weight given to children's
well-being than those who have saved.
(iv)  The  analysis  of  the  role  of  preferences  can  be  continued  by  considering
interactions. The correlation between g and d is negative (- 0.34) : being prudent (a higher
value of g) is to some extent the same as being conscious of the future (a low value of d).
These interactions are significant predictors of wealth : between the individual the  most
prudent and far-sighted, and his/her opposite the ratio of predicted gross wealth is  1: 10,
                                                 
5 See, in the [Risk] and [Time] papers, the discussion of the Cronbach Alpha measures (internal consistency of
scores), Principal Component analysis, the regressions of each score, etc.
6 The effect of these preference indicators on the composition of wealth and the demand for different assets is
presented in Arrondel et al. (2004), which defines saver types, interacting risk and time preference scores.
7 We think that the poor measures of the parameters g and d  in American studies explain the absence of effects
of these preferences. On the other hand, the "propensity to plan ahead", which is significant, is in fact an indirect








































ceteris paribus. While this may seem large, it should be considered in the context of the ratio
of wealth between the first and tenth deciles, of the order of 100 to 1...
8
1.  THE WEALTH EQUATION
The wealth equation derived from the life-cycle hypothesis emphasises the role of two
explanatory variables : the (demographic) position in the life cycle, described in some detail (to
allow for differences in needs or for liquidity constraints, for example) ; and the  level of
resources. Our aim here is to evaluate the role of preference heterogeneity in explaining the
part of the wealth distribution which remains unexplained in this equation.
1.1. Observable determinants of wealth accumulation
The dependant variable is the log of  wealth,  Log A (notably  to  account  for  the
skewness of the wealth distribution, and the importance of measurement error). The basic
equation for wealth at time t is as follows :
Log At  =  f (at, YP, It, V, V't) + e,  (1)
where at is the age of the household head, YP a measure of permanent income (over total, past
and future life), and It represents wealth transfers already received. The variables V and V't
cover demographic variables, which are either permanent (education) or time-varying (family
composition or unemployment, for example). Wealth At is a net measure, but  we  will use
similar regressions to analyse gross wealth (which does not  take debts  into  account) and
financial wealth (which corresponds, for the majority of households, to gross wealth excluding
the housing component).
Age is predicted to have a highly non linear, hump-shaped relationship with wealth,
reaching a maximum at retirement age. The subsequent running down of wealth will be limited
by both precautionary saving, reflecting uncertainty over life expectancy, and any motive for
intergenerational transfers.
The estimation of any age effect using cross-section  data,  as  here, is  subject  to
potentially serious biases in both directions. Decumulation of wealth at old age will be under-
estimated as mortality is negatively correlated with wealth. On the other hand, cohort effects
linked to economic growth and the development of financial markets, will tend to overstate the
lower level of wealth of older generations.
                                                
8 A less enjoyable conclusion in our paper is that there is no satisfactory short-cut which avoids the construction
of scores, as carried out here. In particular, the 0 to 10 self-reported scales (at the end of the questionnaire), with
respect to risk, impatience and time preference, lead to the same qualitative results as evoked in points (i) to (iv),








































As saving is only deferred consumption, the proportionality hypothesis should hold :
a doubling of permanent income should be associated with a doubling of wealth, ceteris
paribus. In practice, a number of factors are likely to yield an estimated relationship whereby
wealth rises more than proportionately with permanent income : capital market imperfections
work to the advantage of richer households (due to threshold effects, increasing returns as a
function of the size of the capital investment, and so on); higher earnings may also be more
risky, leading to more precautionary saving ; life expectancy rises with  wealth ; voluntary
bequests are a luxury good, and so on (see Masson, 1988).
9
Over the whole sample, we proxy YP by  occupational group, education and current
income. For the sub-sample of currently (or previously) salaried households, we follow the
method proposed in Lollivier and Verger (1999), and estimate a more precise indicator of
permanent income which allows us to split current (non property)  income into a long-term
component, identified with YP, a part linked with age, which picks up  systematic life-cycle
variation in income, and a short-term component which reflects transitory phenomena (see
Table 5c).
Apart from its own resources, YP, the household may benefit from transfers from
parents, I. Life-cycle theory predicts that YP and I should have an identical effect on saving.
Empirical tests, which suppose a sufficiently accurate measure of I, find that this is not the
case : the propensity to save out of family transfers is higher (see Masson, 1988). It would
ideally be useful to control for expected bequests, I', which may  have diverse effects on
current wealth accumulation (having rich parents may reduce the fixed costs associated with
investing, but also discourage saving). We have only introduced a dummy variable for having
received bequests (in some specifications we include the size of the bequests : see Tables 5b
and 5c).
10
Demographic characteristics - marital status, family composition, labour market status
of the head of household and his/her spouse (retired, employed or unemployed), and current
and past health - control for tastes and needs in models of consumption-smoothing over the
life cycle (see Attanasio and Browning, 1995). However, these demographic variables can be
interpreted in a number of other ways. For example, two-earner households may represent
risk-sharing, and facilitate borrowing and increase labour supply  flexibility (thus reducing the
impact of liquidity or borrowing constraints). Perhaps  more worrying, these demographic
variables might be indirect measures of  the  very  preferences that  we  wish  to  measure
independently : being married with children is thus likely to reduce time preference (see the
[Time] paper).
                                                
9 Permanent income YP is sometimes decomposed into permanent earnings YP' and a wealth equivalent of
pension rights, to test for any substitution between these latter and traditional saving. As  permanent income
only plays the role of a control variable here, we have not undertaken this decomposition.
10 Expected bequests have not been taken into account, except via the inclusion of parents' social class in Tables
5b and 5c (Theil decompositions). They are used as instruments in the  exogeneity tests  of  the  preference








































Although the function f in the wealth equation (1) may be highly non-linear, most of
the  explanatory  variables  appear  additively.  However,  age,  income  and  education  are
introduced as discrete, rather than continuous, variables in order to allow some flexibility (see
the first two columns of Appendix Tables A1 to A3).
1.2. The role of individual preferences
This  specification  of  the  wealth  equation  allows  us  to  evaluate  the  impact  of
preferences : do the five preference indicators have the effects predicted by theory in
explaining part of the residual e in equation (1) ? We therefore estimate :
Log At  =  f' (at, YP, It, V, V't) + g (g, d, q, b, q 
nf) + e'.  (2)
The predicted effects from life-cycle theory of the first three preference parameters on
wealth are clear, and robust to theoretical extensions. The existence of precautionary saving
given uncertainty of income or life-expectancy should yield a positive relationship between
wealth and g, which is an indicator of general attitudes regarding risk and uncertainty. The
effect of the discount rate, d, is predicted to be negative : a lower value of d corresponds to a
longer horizon and thus to greater life-cycle saving. Last, greater family altruism leads to more
saving for the benefit of one's children (a positive effect of q).
The relationship between wealth and b, the measure of short-term impatience picking
up both individuals who "don't  like to  wait"  and time inconsistency, is  much less clear.
Regarding asset choice, a higher value of b should be associated with assets that require little
time to manage, or a contractual saving scheme to encourage discipline (especially for the more
far-sighted, with a low value of d) ; alternatively, we might expect unplanned borrowing for
those who have little self-control (especially if they are short-sighted). However, despite the
work of Laibson (1997), we know little about the influence of b on the level of saving, which
is the subject of the current paper. Indeed, contrary to the discount rate, d, the degree of short-
term impatience tells us nothing about the saver's decision horizon.
We equally cannot predict the impact of non-family altruism, q 
nf, which measures the
individual's concern for (unrelated) future generations. Some experimental work has interpreted
this humanism as (the inverse of) preference for the present ; we, however, are not convinced
that q 
nf can be identified with the discount rate, d. As such, non-family altruism may seem
irrelevant for wealth accumulation in the majority of individuals or households, with perhaps
the exception of the richest, where charitable bequests or gifts to science or for the protection
of the environment may come into play.
The estimation of the impact of preferences on wealth accumulation in equation (2) is
not straightforward, as preferences themselves may be determined by wealth. We expand on









































2. THE EFFECT OF PREFERENCES
The  wealth  equation  (2)  is  estimated  introducing  our  preference  indicators  as
explanatory variables (either scores, scales, or lottery choices), either as continuous (Appendix
Tables A1 to A3) or dummy variables representing the quartiles of the relevant distribution. In
each case, three regressions are estimated, covering financial wealth, gross wealth, and net
wealth (this latter is calculated by subtracting the current level of debt). The other explanatory
variables include age (in five-year groups), current non property  income in deciles, education,
social class, household type,  number of  children (not  living at  home), bequests received,
liquidity constraints, spells of unemployment, health problems, and so on.
11
The first two columns of Appendix Tables A1 to A3 (which correspond to financial,
gross and net wealth respectively) show the results from wealth equations estimated on the
whole sample of households in the 1997 Insee Wealth survey (10 150 households) and our
"experimental" sub-sample (1 130 households). The results are qualitatively similar (given the
difference in sample sizes), except for the variables measuring career interruptions (for reasons
of unemployment or health) which are insignificant in the smaller sample.
12
2.1. Preference Scores
The last column of the Appendix Tables introduces preference scores as a continuous
variable. The extra explanatory power associated with these variables is only small for all three
wealth measures (the R
2 rising by less than two percentage points). Given the skewness of
wealth, this is unsurprising. Together, the preference variables are very significantly correlated
with wealth. While short-term impatience and non-family altruism are not  correlated with
wealth, the other three variables are significant (at least at the ten per cent level, and at the one
per cent level for time preference), with the signs predicted by theory.
Keeping the same set of explanatory variables, Table 1 shows the results when scores
are introduced as dummy variables (representing the quartiles of each distribution) to pick up
potential non-linear effects. For all three measures of wealth, prudence, being far-sighted, and
being altruistic with respect to the family all increase wealth : household saving therefore has
precautionary, foresight, and bequest elements. Impatience and non-family altruism play  no
role in explaining wealth, which is again in line with theoretical predictions.
2.2. Preference scores are better than other preference measures
                                                
11 Liquidity constraints are measured using  a dummy  variable based on  two  survey questions : whether the
household had been refused credit, or if he had avoided asking for credit for fear of being refused.
12 This "experimental" sub-sample consists of higher-educated households  who  are  relatively  infrequently
working class ; they are thus less likely to suffer career interruptions from unemployment or poor health, which








































Table 2 estimates the same wealth regressions, replacing the scores with respect to
risk, time preference and impatience by their corresponding self-reported scales. It is evident
that the latter do a worse job in explaining wealth accumulation than do  the  associated
preference scores. Only the time preference scale has a statistically significant impact, in the
expected direction, on wealth.
Table 3 focuses on different measures of risk preferences. The first panel (Table 3a)
includes an experimental measure of risk-aversion (in four levels) proposed by Barsky et al.
(1997). Respondents choose between  lotteries  concerning career choices (see  the  [Risk]
paper). Around 3 000 households answer these questions (the "recto-verso" questionnaire).
The results are weak : the only significant result is that non-respondents have lower levels of
wealth… Related research has produced similarly disappointing results, leading to suggestions
that this approach be supplanted by more anecdotal questions relating to risk (see Kapteyn
and Teppa, 2002).
In the sub-sample of 423 households who replied to both measures (lottery  and
"experimental" questionnaire), the lottery measure is insignificant, while the preference score
remains positive and significant in the gross wealth equation (at the five per cent level) and the
net wealth equation (at the ten per cent level) - see the second panel (Table 3b). Again, the
summary measure of preferences outperforms measures based on a single question, however
precise this may be.
13
3. PREFERENCES AND WEALTH : THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY
The above discussion ignored the question of reverse causality between preferences
and wealth. Standard models of saving and portfolio choice often include the hypothesis  of
absolute risk aversion decreasing in wealth (Arrow, 1965). Recent theories have also linked
lower time depreciation to higher wealth (Becker and Mulligan, 1997). Reverse causality is
therefore a potential problem in equation (2) : the rich may take more risks, have more
foresight, or again be more altruistic with respect to their children. Simple regression results
are therefore difficult to interpret : the negative effect of time preference and the  positive
effect  of  family  altruism,  especially,  may  be  statistical  artefacts  rather  than  causal
relationships.
We therefore re-estimate our wealth equations using instrumental variables to evaluate
the robustness of our results, and to test  for the endogeneity of our preference scores (see
Appendix 2).
                                                
13 The lottery variable is a better predictor of the demand for risky assets (Arrondel and Masson, 2003, p. 96) in
regressions carried out on "recto-verso" sample. However, over the common sub-sample (423 households), the








































3.1. Scores of preference are exogenous
The instruments used for risk and time preference, and family altruism reflect the
characteristics of the respondent's parents (social class, wealth composition, money problems,
and risk and time preferences). Appendix 2 shows that these instruments pass  the standard
quality and validity tests. The results then show that the preference scores can be considered
as exogenous, so that the previous regressions were not significantly affected by causality
bias.
This conclusion is in a way not surprising, as the scores can be considered as the sum
of a number of elements which can be considered as "natural" instruments (Angrist and
Krueger, 2001). Regarding risk attitudes, the question about whether the  individual "takes
his/her umbrella if there is a chance of rain", which appears strongly correlated with the risk
score, has no direct effect on the amount of wealth. Similarly, the "ability to forego current
pleasure in order to live longer", which is strongly correlated with the time discount score,
does not explain household assets.
14
3.2. The endogeneity of alternative preference indicators
Following on from the above, it is natural to think that the scores can be used as
instruments for other preference parameters. The  variables which  are  instrumented thus
become, in a sense, "disguised" scores. Risk-attitude and time preference scales are considered
in Appendix 2 : the risk-attitude and time-preference scores are very good instruments for the
corresponding scales.
The instrumental variables results show that only the scale of time preference can be
considered as endogenous (in all three wealth equations). The OLS results for this scale are
thus biased. Nonetheless, the IV results are in the same direction and are actually somewhat
stronger : being far-sighted is positively correlated with wealth.
15
4. THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF SCORES
Having shown that preference scores are indeed correlated with wealth, we can now
return to recent debates revolving around the possibility that  heterogeneity in preferences
explains the distribution of observed wealth (given age and income), as well as the insufficient
resources of a number of households when they retire.
                                                
14 Only the family altruism score seems endogenous (at the six per cent level) in the financial wealth regression.
This score is indeed constructed from a smaller number of elements, of which a number are directly related to
wealth (notably transfers to children).
15 We also considered IV estimation for scales without the scores as instruments. Instrument quality is sharply
reduced, although it remains acceptable. But the exogeneity of the scales is no longer  rejected in  this








































4.1. The quantitative effects of preferences on wealth amounts
Table 4 summarises the effects of preference scores on financial, gross and net wealth :
the figures show estimated amounts, normalised to 100, everything being equal. The scores are
variously entered as quartiles (as in Table 1), or continuously (as in the Appendix Tables).
With respect to the continuous variables, the most prudent individuals (those with the
maximum score of risk aversion) possess, ceteris paribus, twice as much wealth as the most
foolhardy (those with the minimum score), regardless of the type of wealth. Equally, the most
far-sighted individuals (those with the lowest discount rate) have 3.5 times as much wealth
(financial and gross) as the most short-sighted (and 2.5 times as much net wealth). Last, the
most altruistic (in the family sense) have twice as much wealth (financial and gross) as the
most egotistical individuals (and 2.5 times as much net wealth).
The same effects remain quantitatively important in the more representative case when
respondents are classed according to the quartiles of the different scores. For gross wealth, for
example, we predict a difference of 51 % between the most and the least prudent individuals,
84 % between the  most  and least far-sighted, and 32 % between the  most  and the  least
altruistic (in the family sense).
4.2. Preference scores and wealth inequality
We use two approaches to measure the contribution of the different  explanatory
variables to  the  distribution of  wealth.  The  first is  an  analysis of  variance,  using  the
regressions described above ; the second uses the Theil indicator, which can be decomposed.
Table 5a presents partial R
2 coefficients for each of the explanatory variables in the
regressions.  These  coefficients  measure  the  strength  of  the  relationship  between  the
explanatory variable in question and wealth, ceteris paribus. We can thus create a ranking of
the explanatory factors of wealth. Four of the variables have a much stronger explanatory
power than the others, in all of the wealth equations, with coefficients over 0.15 : earnings,
age, occupational group, and having received inheritances. This underlines the importance of
life-cycle effects and resources (income and transfers) on  wealth accumulation. After  this
group, preferences and household type  are the next most important variables, with partial R
2
coefficients between 12 and 14 %. The rest of the explanatory variables are some distance
behind. Education, for example, has a partial R
2 coefficient of between 5 and 9 %.
Tables 5b and 5c present the Theil decomposition of the distribution of wealth for a
number of different samples. The full sample and full salaried sample of the Patrimoine 1997
survey give reference rankings ; the "experimental" sub-samples (equally full and salaried)
allow then to compare the preference parameters to the full set of explanatory variables.
The whole sample results in Table 5b confirm the hierarchy presented  above with
respect  to  the  analysis  of  variance : the  four  most  important  variables in  the  Theil
decomposition are occupational group, the amount of bequests, earnings and age. For gross








































earnings 20.7 % and age 17.4 %. The  joint contribution of  income and age only  explains
28.8 % of wealth inequality, which underlines the disparities in wealth within a given age and
 income cell.
Behind the top four, we find individual preferences : the scores of risk and time
preferences and family altruism explain together 10.2 % of the gross wealth distribution
16.
This figure is far greater than that for other explanatory variables, such as education (5.1 %) or
household type (5.3 %).
17
This classification is largely unchanged for the sample of wage-earners for whom we
have calculated a measure of permanent income. As expected, the percentage of gross wealth
explained by income (36 %) and age (29.5 %) are much higher in this sample ; the figure for
permanent income is somewhat smaller (20 %) than that for current non property  income
(which includes carrier effects). However, the interaction between age and permanent income
explains almost half of the distribution of wealth (47.3 %) : not surprisingly, the life-cycle
hypothesis seems to work much better in this sub-sample. Accordingly, individual preference
scores - largely inspired by a life-cycle framework - are together more strongly correlated
with the distribution of  gross wealth (15.6 %), and more so  than  education (11.5 %) or,
notably, household type (2.1 %).
4.3. Insufficient Retirement Saving and Individual Preferences
Do preferences play a role in explaining insufficient retirement saving ? To answer this
question, we look at those households in the "experimental" sub-sample whose head is aged
between 50 and 65 (268 households out of 1135). We then separate those for whom the ratio
of wealth to (estimated) permanent income is under 2 (60 households, representing 22 % of
the  age  cohort).  Table  6  shows  the  distribution  of  preference  parameters  (in  first,
medium - 2
nd and 3
rd -  and last quartiles) for the low savers and other households.
Statistically, only the time preference and family altruism scores are correlated with
saving ; risk-aversion plays no significant role. Amongst the low savers we  find a greater
percentage of short-sighted households (25.9 % against 11 %), and a smaller one of altruistic
households (15.5 % against 28.6 %). However, differences in preferences are far from being
able to explain the whole phenomenon of inadequate saving, as illustrated by the non negligible
percentage of far-sighted households amongst the low savers (25.8 %).
18
                                                
16 The large number of cells corresponding to  preferences (21) could potentially inflate their impact on  the
distribution of wealth. It should be noted, however, that the joint contribution of the risk and time preference
scores (9 cells) is 6.9 %, and that of time preference and family altruism (also 9 cells) is already 8.8 %.
17 The "gains and losses in wealth" variable picks up events which have augmented wealth (lottery winnings,
changes in prices of goods such as housing or land) or reduced it  (gambling losses). By  construction, it  is
unsurprising that this variable is correlated with household assets.









































The econometric analysis of wealth shows that, even though the gain in the part  of
variance explained by the introduction of the preference parameters is modest, these variables
are powerful predictors of household wealth. The Theil decomposition underlines, moreover,
the joint importance of these measures in explaining wealth inequality. These results suggest
that the interaction between preferences is an important facet of wealth determination.
We first consider the correlations between the different parameters, and then examine
the effect of the couple of risk and time preferences scores on wealth.
5.1. The correlations between risk-attitude and time preference
The  correlations  between  different  preference  measures  (scores  and  scales)  are
presented in Table 7. The particular link between risk-attitude and time preference appears in
Table 8, which shows the distribution of households between weak, average, and strong levels
of the two variables (in quartiles).
The most interesting correlation is that (-0.34) between the risk and time preference
scores : individuals who are risk-averse tend to be  far-sighted. There  is  also  a  negative
relationship, although weaker, between the two corresponding scales (-0.17). These results
reinforce the common confusion between prudence and concern for the future.
Table 8 shows that 49 % of individuals who are only weakly risk-averse have a strong
time preference, whereas only 6.5 % are far-sighted. Symmetrically, amongst the risk-averse,
41 % are far-sighted and only 9.8 % have a strong preference for the  present.  The  same
phenomenon is found in the scales, although less pronounced, since we find almost 10 % of
individuals in the "minority" configurations, as opposed to only 3.8 % in the score analysis.
To our knowledge, the only other study which has considered the correlation between
risk aversion and time preference is that of Anderhub et al. (2001), who present experimental
results from 61 students at the University of Haifa, who are asked to evaluate three lotteries.
These lotteries differ only by their payment date (immediate, in 4 weeks time, and in 8 weeks
time). They find a positive correlation between the two measures : "risk-averse agents tend to
discount the future more strongly". However, the  estimated discount rate corresponds to
monetary gains and can thus be considered more as a self-assessed interest rate than a pure
preference for the present.
19
There is also a strong negative correlation between time preference and altruism (family
or non-family) : concern for future generations is concentrated amongst the far-sighted. The
relation is stronger between the time preference score and family altruism (-0.38). Last, the
                                                 
19 Our questionnaire contains a similar question (IV.Q6), which asks individuals how much they were willing to
pay now for a 100 Franc note which would be given in one month's, six months', and one year's time.  The
correlation between this question on time preference and the risk-aversion score is negative (– 0.11), contrarily to








































correlation between the two altruism measures is fairly small, at around 0.25. It is  indeed
possible to be altruistic for one's family but not for others.
Short-term impatience and time preference are positively correlated, but weakly so
(+ 0.12) : the impatient tend to discount the future more. On the other hand, risk-lovers seem
relatively impatient (with a correlation coefficient of -0.21 between the scales).
Being risk-loving or impatient goes hand in hand with  a certain egoism, especially
within the family, as if taking risks were sometimes incompatible with a concern for one's
descendants.
5.2. Score Interactions and Wealth
Table 9 shows the same kind of wealth regressions as Table 1, but interacting the risk
and time preference scores (both grouped into three classes). Finally, given some small cell
sizes, seven different types of savers are considered. It is those who are most risk-averse and
most far-sighted who accumulate the most wealth. On the contrary, present-oriented risk-
lovers have the lowest levels of wealth.
The importance of these interacted scores is illustrated in Table 10 by  the estimated
wealth level of each type of saver (the average level of wealth being normalised to 100).
With continuous scores, individuals who are both the most far-sighted and risk-averse
have a level of gross wealth ten times greater, ceteris paribus, than those who are the most
short-sighted and risk-loving. This ratio is of the order of seven to one for net wealth. The
hierarchy is different for financial wealth : here it is the individuals who are the most short-
sighted and risk-averse who have the lowest amounts of financial wealth (15 times less than
the most risk-averse and the most far-sighted).
With interactions of scores in quartiles, the differences in predicted wealth are smaller
but remain sizeable. The most risk-averse and far-sighted hold 82 % more financial wealth than
short-sighted risk-lovers, with corresponding figures of  91 % and 54 % for gross and net
wealth respectively.
5.3. Perspectives
The importance  of  interacting preference parameters  can  also  be  seen  when  we
consider the composition of wealth (see Arrondel et al., 2004). For example, the demand for
risky assets (such as shares, mutual funds, or liquid assets) is independent of risk and time
preference parameters when these are entered linearly ; however, when we interact the two
preference parameters, we find that it is short-sighted and prudent individuals who tend to
hold less risky assets.
More generally, we can use preferences over risk and time to define different types of
savers, with heterogeneous saving decisions and portfolio choices :








































-  Far-sighted  and  prudent  agents  (low  d, high g) will  behave  more  alike  the
"representative" life-cycle consumer ;
- Short-sighted and less risk-averse households (high d, low g) may,  like Achilles,
follow  risky,  self-destructing  accumulation  strategies  (unbalanced  budget,  high
debts…) ;
- Finally, far-sighted and less risk-averse households (low d, low g) will behave more
like Ulysses…
Preliminary econometric analysis regarding the  amount and composition of  wealth
shows that this saver typology has significant additional explanatory power with, moreover,
differential effects confirming theoretical predictions. For instance, Achilles-like households
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Saving and Wealth Inequality : the Limits of the Behavioural Approach
The risk of an ideological interpretation of the behavioural analysis of saving can be seen
in Venti and Wise (2001). Taking a "post-welfarist" position, the authors suppose that it is
possible to clearly distinguish the part of savings that  is  due to  exogenous circumstances
(chance) from that which depends on individual decisions (choice). They  then identify the
latter component with the contribution of preferences. As such, they  examine differences in
wealth at given age and permanent income (more precisely at retirement age for each decile of
lifetime earnings), and try  to  determine the  contributions of  circumstances and individual
decisions in this distribution.
The importance of "chance" factors is evaluated, for each decile of permanent income,
by a wealth equation as a function of a number of variables which are supposed  to reflect
these factors : inheritances and bequests received, and a number of  demographic variables
(marital status, family  composition,  health,  and  so  on).  These  regressions are,  perhaps
unsurprisingly, relatively limited with respect to their explanatory power. Venti and Wise
then attribute the unexplained part of wealth (85 %) to individual choices. Following similar
analyses for the impact of the choice of more or less risky portfolios on wealth, they conclude
that "the bulk of the dispersion of wealth [within each income decile] must be attributed to
differences in the amounts that households choose to save".
Venti and Wise define also a wealth norm by calculating the amount of  wealth that
households would possess at retirement  age "had  they  saved  consistently  and  invested
prudently over the course of their working lives". These norm amounts are substantial, even in
the first income decile, and are notably higher than the wealth levels observed in the HRS. The
conclusion which seems to naturally follow is that individuals have only limited rationality.
They lack self-control, cannot commit to simple saving rules, and do not plan ahead enough.
As such they regret not having saved more when they were younger, as is shown in the replies
to an experimental savings questionnaire introduced in the HRS.
Other "behavioural" analyses of saving (Lusardi, 2003 and 2004; Ameriks et al., 2003,
amongst others) follow the same lines. Venti and Wise go further however. Given that, (1)
saving is desirable, both for individuals and for economic growth, (2) accumulated wealth is
nothing but a stock of deferred consumption for the household, and (3) the distribution of
saving results essentially from individual choices, they conclude that taxation of saving by
older households, and notably that of private pensions, is unfair and inefficient. Why, at a
given level of life-cycle resources, would we wish to penalise "saving" households, who have








































Households with less wealth then only have themselves to blame... However, a number
of the key stages leading to this conclusion can be criticised. In particular, it is essential to
split chance off from choice, and then to estimate the part of wealth which is due to exogenous
circumstances ; the residual is then allocated to choice. The pitfalls of such an approach are
well-known, even applied to the simpler problem of assessing the role of inheritances and own
saving in personal wealth accumulation. Kotlikoff concludes that  inheritances account for
80 % of aggregate wealth (in the United States), whereas Modigliani provides a figure of only
20 %. The large gap between the figures is not explained only by methodological differences
but also by  interaction effects between inherited and saved wealth (Kessler and Masson,
1989).
20
For those who wish to decompose wealth into chance and choice, (complex) interaction
effects likely play a role here too. In this study, we find that preferences over risk and time
have significant effects on wealth, but the estimated coefficients imply that only a small part
of the distribution of wealth, given age and lifecycle income, is explained. Venti and Wise
(2001) find an equally limited role for chance factors in wealth inequality. We can only then
attribute the rest of the gap to interactions between the explanatory variables. In explaining
wealth,  we  conclude  with  the  French  motto  that  "success  is  talent  multiplied by
circumstances".
21
                                                
20 For example, an inheritance which is received when investment opportunities are favourable may open the
door to new investment. However, the same inheritance, if anticipated for too long,  may discourage personal
savings and transform the individual into a rentier.
21 An alternative decomposition, not totally orthogonal to the choice and chance of Venti et Wise, dates back to
the Wealth Theories of the 1950s and 1960s : wealth is  split  into  "desired", A*, and "undesired", A - A*,
components. The latter results from constraints and circumstances that the household experiences in the market
and in life. In this context, precautionary saving from the buffer-stock model clearly belongs to  the second
component. Aggregate level analysis has produced a wide range of estimates of the size of this saving : between
1 and 60 % (see Arrondel and Masson, 1996). Low values call into question the explanatory value of the buffer-
stock model, but excessively high values pose another problem. If precautionary saving explains 95 % of wealth,
then this latter is mostly undesired : a large value of wealth would then be synonymous with severe exposure to
imperfections of the capital and insurance markets ; a smaller value of wealth would on the contrary imply that









































Individual Preferences and Wealth Accumulation: the Problem of Causality
The major contribution of the wealth equations in Appendix Tables concerns the effect
of individual preferences on wealth. These equations are estimated by  OLS. However, if
preferences are themselves determined by wealth, then the OLS coefficients are biased, and
our conclusions are potentially erroneous.
Instrumental variables and endogeneity tests











where X1 denotes  the  vector  of  potentially  endogenous preference  parameters,  X2  the
exogenous variables and u a normally-distributed error term.
The usual solution for causality problems is  instrumental variables (IV) estimation,
where the instruments are supposed to be orthogonal to the dependent variable, W.
The method of Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) provides a class of IV estimators in two
stages. First, one or more instruments (denoted hereafter by the vector Z1) provide, with the
other exogenous variables X2, an OLS "prediction" of the potentially endogenous explanatory
variables :
. 2 2 1 1 1 i i i i i i v Z v X Z X + = + + = a a a (B)
Second, the predicted values (
† 
ˆ  X  1) are substituted into equation (A) which is re-estimated by
OLS:
. ˆ
22 2 12 1 i MC i MC i i w b X b X W + + = (C)
If the instruments are correlated with the potentially endogenous explanatory variables, but
orthogonal to the dependent variable, the 2SLS estimator is consistent. In practice, we have to
check (see Tables E) both the quality (correlation between X1 and Z, and between X1 and Z1 in
equation (B)) and the statistical validity of the instruments (orthogonality between Z1 and u)
from the following regression, where the coefficients m should not be significantly different
from zero:
. ˆ 1 i i i Z w e m + = (D)
The 2SLS estimators also allow to test the endogeneity of the  explanatory variables








































estimators (OLS and 2SLS). This test is equivalent to carrying out, by OLS, an "augmented"
regression in which the dependent variable, W, is estimated as a function of all the explanatory
variables (X) and of the residuals (
† 
ˆ  v ) estimated in the instrumental equation (B) from the first
stage m (see Holly, 1983) :
. ˆ i i i i u d v b X W + + = (E)
If the variables in question are exogenous, the estimated coefficients d on the residuals
will  be  insignificant  (we  can  show  in  fact  that  d = v v u Var  / ) , ( Cov ) ; if  the  estimated
coefficients are significant, then exogeneity is rejected (see Tables E).
The instrumentation of individual preferences : scores, scales and "plans"
Many of the preference measures are potentially endogenous in our wealth equations :
the scores themselves, the scales, or even the single questions which are supposed to measure
certain taste parameters (such as the propensity to establish long-term projects).
The main difficulty is finding good instruments for preferences which are independent of
wealth. When instruments are weak, "the cure can be worse than the disease" (Bound et al.,
1995).
a) Scores
Table E1 summarises the results from endogeneity tests of the scores of risk and time
preferences and family altruism.
The instruments used reflect characteristics of the parents of  the  respondent  (social
class, wealth composition, money problems, preferences over risk and time) and the existence
of gifts given by the household
22. In all of the regressions, the instruments are significantly
correlated with the scores and largely pass the validity (or over-identification) tests. While the
R
2 statistic (of the instruments) is not particularly high (between 4 %  and  12 %), it  is
nonetheless much larger than that  resulting from  endogeneity tests  in  American studies
(Lusardi, 2003, and Ameriks et al., 2003).
All of the scores bar one pass the exogeneity test. The residuals from the instrumental
equations are never significant, except that for family altruism which is significant at the 6 %
level in the financial wealth equation. We then conclude that the OLS estimates of equation
(A) do not suffer from causality bias.
b) The scales of risk-aversion and time preference
Two series of regressions are analysed here. The first is analogous to that above, applied
to the two scales (of risk-aversion and time preference). The second uses, in addition, the
scores as natural instruments to explain the scales.
                                                
22 Using parental preference variables as instruments is analogous to the practice in panel econometrics of using








































The results of the first series of regressions are shown in Table E2. The conclusions are
similar to those from the analysis of the scores. For the instruments which pass  the quality
and validity tests, the two scales seem exogenous ; the OLS estimators are thus unbiased.
The conclusion changes sharply when we instrument the scales with the scores (Table
E3). We first note that the introduction of the scores considerably improves the quality of the
instrumentation : the partial R
2 coefficients are now between 14 % and 21 % with F-statistics
multiplied roughly by a factor of five. Over-identification tests show that the instruments are
orthogonal to the residual of equation (A). However, contrary to the results in the first series
of regressions, we now reject, for all three measures of wealth, the hypothesis of exogeneity in
the case of time preference.
The IV or 2SLS  estimators  yield  a  positive  correlation between  the  three  wealth
measures and the fact of considering oneself as preoccupied by the future on a scale of 0 to 10.
The quantitative effect of this variable is however almost four times larger in 2SLS than OLS.
c) Plans (from 0 to 30 years)
A number of American studies (Lusardi, 2003, and Ameriks et al., 2003) have looked at
the relationship between an ability to plan for the future (rather than an indicator of time
preference) and wealth. They  use one or two subjective questions, which are supposed  to
measure this propensity. Ameriks  et  al. (2003)  specifically consider long-term financial
planning for retirement ; Lusardi (2003) looks at worries expressed about retirement.
 23
In a similar way, we can use a question in our survey asking individuals if they have (or
had) made plans in a number of different areas of their life (career, family leisure time, wealth
etc.) over a period of 10, 20, or 30 years or more. In the OLS equations for gross and net
wealth, this question attracts a statistically significant coefficient (Table E4).
To instrument planning
24, we use in the first instance only the time preference of the
respondent's mother (see Table E4). This instrument passes the tests of quality and validity,
but even so the correlation with the planning variable is weak (0.6 %). We therefore have weak
instruments which can produce biased IV estimators… as in the two American studies cited (a
correlation between 0.2 and 1.2 % in Lusardi, 2003, for example)
25. Exogeneity is only rejected
for gross wealth. The IV estimator, positive, is much larger than its OLS counterpart.
                                                
23 In the two cited articles, the authors consider that the variable is endogenous, so that they have to  turn to
instrumentation. They do not carry out exogeneity tests. Ameriks et al. (2003) instrument the propensity to plan
by other subjective questions supposed to be less correlated with wealth. These concern preparation for holidays,
and confidence in  one's ability  to  calculate. Lusardi (2003) instruments "worrying about retirement" by  the
difference in age between the respondent and his/her eldest brother or sister, and by  parents' health, the idea
being that one benefits from one's siblings' or parents' experience.
24 Since the variable to be instrumented is ordinal (the planning horizon in four bands) we should use an ordered
Probit for the instrumental regression. Angrist and Krueger (2001) show, however, that a qualitative model does
not produce consistent estimators if the specification is inexact.
25 Ameriks et al. (2003) only  show the F-statistic of the instruments, which is  very significant (<0.0001).








































In Table E5 we use the time preference score as an instrument for planning. Instrument
quality rises sharply (the partial R
2 is multiplied by 10 and the F-statistic by 7). Exogeneity is
rejected in all of the wealth regressions. We still find the positive relation between the time-
length of planning and household wealth in  the  IV  results,  with  a  quantitatively  larger
correlation than in the OLS estimations. Note that, for gross wealth, the difference between
the IV and OLS estimators is smaller when we use the score as an instrument. The difference
between the two IV estimators can be traced back to the weakness of the instruments other







































1Variables Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level
Exogeneity Tests in Augmented
Regressions (t-statistic)
Risk-Aversion -0,64 0,521 0,56 0,578 0,22 0,829
Time Preference -0,33 0,740 0,53 0,600 1,15 0,253




2 0,297 0,289 0,301
F 6,380 < 0,0001 7,01 < 0,0001 7,23 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,115 0,072 0,053
F (instruments only) 7,18 < 0,0001 7,19 < 0,0001 6,55 < 0,0001
Time Preference
R
2 0,170 0,162 0,161
F 3,09 < 0,0001 3,34 < 0,0001 3,23 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,066 0,061 0,056
F (instruments only) 3,93 < 0,0001 6,05 < 0,0001 6,90 < 0,0001
Family Altruism
R
2 0,183 0,176 0,179
F 3,40 < 0,0001 3,68 < 0,0001 3,68 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,075 0,044 0,038
F (instruments only) 4,46 < 0,0001 4,29 < 0,0001 4,60 < 0,0001
Instrument Validity
F 0,64 0,882 1,25 0,246 1,13 0,338
Number of Observations
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Instruments. For financial wealth: parents' preferences, money problems when young, parents' social class, bequests or gifts given (20
variables). For gross wealth: parents' preferences, money problems when young, parents' social class, bequests or gifts given (12
variables). For net wealth: parents' preferences, bequests or gifts given (9 variables). 
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Table E1. The Instrumentation of Scores







































1Variables Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level
Exogeneity Tests in Augmented
Regressions (t-statistic)
Risk-Aversion 1,34 0,18 -0,75 0,452 -0,33 0,739




2 0,164 0,148 0,161
F 2,61 < 0,0001 2,62 < 0,0001 2,67 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,080 0,058 0,065
F (instruments only) 4,37 < 0,0001 5,26 < 0,0001 5,44 < 0,0001
Time Preference
R
2 0,130 0,119 0,119
F 1,99 < 0,0001 2,03 < 0,0001 1,89 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,052 0,041 0,044
F (instruments only) 2,75 < 0,0001 3,62 < 0,0001 3,62 < 0,0001
Instrument Validity
F 0,66 0,863 0,77 0,687 0,76 0,697
Number of Observations
Variables Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level
Exogeneity Tests in Augmented
Regressions (t-statistic)
Risk-Aversion 0,54 0,59 -0,59 0,556 -0,15 0,878




2 0,255 0,256 0,258
F 5,35 < 0,0001 5,36 < 0,0001 5,04 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,206 0,206 0,204
F (instruments only) 26,40 < 0,0001 26,46 < 0,0001 24,23 < 0,0001
Time Preference
R
2 0,187 0,187 0,195
F 3,60 < 0,0001 3,59 < 0,0001 3,50 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,137 0,137 0,148
F (instruments only) 16,22 < 0,0001 16,24 < 0,0001 16,41 < 0,0001
Instrument Validity
F 0,59 0,827 0,55 0,855 0,41 0,944
Estimators of the scale of time preference
0,061 0,081 0,068
(0,019) < 0,001 (0,021) < 0,001 (0,021) < 0,001
0,222 0,349 0,247
(0,082) < 0,001 (0,092) < 0,001 (0,085) < 0,001
Number of Observations
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Instruments used: Time Preference and Risk-Aversion Scores, Parents' preferences (10 variables).






Log Gross Wealth Log Net Wealth
1030 1031
Table E2. The Instrumentation of Scales
Log Financial Wealth Log Gross Wealth Log Net Wealth
1029 1031
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Instruments. For financial wealth: parents' preferences, money problems when young, parents' social class, bequests or gifts given (20 variables).
For gross wealth: parents' preferences, money problems when young, parents' social class, bequests or gifts given (12 variables). For net wealth:








































1Variables Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level
Exogeneity Tests in Augmented
Regressions (t-statistic) -1,64 0,101 -2,39 0,017 -1,560 0,119
Instrument Quality
R
2 0,102 0,100 0,099
F 2,22 < 0,0001 2,21 < 0,0001 2,04 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,007 0,006 0,006
F (instruments only) 3,77 < 0,02 3,51 < 0,03 3,32 < 0,04
Instrument Validity
F 0,21 0,812 0,11 0,895 0,13 0,876
Estimators
0,008 0,012 0,013




Variables Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level Statistic Critical Level
Exogeneity Tests in Augmented
Regressions (t-statistic) 4,680 < 0,0001 -4,180 < 0,0001 -3,570 < 0,001
Instrument Quality
R
2 0,167 0,166 0,171
F 3,85 < 0,0001 3,89 < 0,0001 3,74 < 0,0001
R
2 (instruments only) 0,066 0,066 0,075
F (instruments only) 26,49 < 0,0001 26,35 < 0,0001 28,43 < 0,0001
Instrument Validity
F 0,24 0,869 0,76 0,517 0,31 0,821
Estimators
0,008 0,012 0,013
(0,005) 0,14 (0,006) 0,04 (0,006) 0,03
0,090 0,096 0,081
(0,021) < 0,0001 (0,023) < 0,0001 (0,021) < 0,001
Nombre d'observations
Note: The dependent variable takes four values (no plans, plans over 10, 20, or 30 years or more)
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Instruments used: Mother's Time Preference (2 variables).





Table E4. Instrumentation of plans (from 0 to 30 years)
Table E5. Instrumentation of plans (from 0 to 30 years) including the score
Note: The dependent variable takes four values (no plans, plans over 10, 20, or 30 years or more)
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
OLS











































1Variables Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Household non property income (Omitted category: 1st 
decile)
2nd decile 0,231 3,21 0,365 1,60 0,335 1,49
3rd decile 0,567 7,80 0,169 0,70 0,160 0,67
4th decile 0,772 10,47 0,477 2,10 0,427 1,90
5th decile 0,939 12,59 0,765 3,29 0,683 2,97
6th decile 1,249 16,37 1,063 4,53 0,979 4,21
7th decile 1,342 17,26 1,223 5,25 1,129 4,88
8th decile 1,477 18,71 1,101 4,48 1,053 4,31
9th decile 1,588 19,47 1,287 5,22 1,177 4,81
10th decile 2,074 24,52 2,017 7,64 1,916 7,25
Age (Omitted category: under 25)
25-30 0,136 1,28 0,190 0,60 0,192 0,62
30-35 0,402 3,77 0,274 0,85 0,332 1,04
35-40 0,435 4,04 0,689 2,12 0,683 2,12
40-45 0,470 4,34 0,405 1,23 0,375 1,15
45-50 0,618 5,75 0,458 1,37 0,393 1,19
50-55 0,854 7,82 0,795 2,36 0,662 1,97
55-60 1,055 9,40 1,157 3,32 1,012 2,92
60-65 1,094 9,69 0,840 2,32 0,722 1,99
65-70 1,282 11,27 1,398 4,00 1,248 3,56
70-75 1,403 12,15 1,643 4,54 1,493 4,09
75+ 1,480 13,25 1,976 5,26 1,711 4,51
Social class of the reference person (Omitted category: 
Artisan, shopkeeper, factory owner)
Farmer 0,265 3,64 0,272 1,01 0,279 1,05
Liberal profession 0,250 1,96 0,245 0,65 0,187 0,50
Executive -0,350 -5,01 -0,560 -2,71 -0,590 -2,88
Employee (high qualification) -0,463 -7,86 -0,348 -1,86 -0,377 -2,03
Employee (low qualification) -0,572 -9,88 -0,737 -3,96 -0,785 -4,23
Workers (high qualification) -0,679 -12,04 -0,873 -4,59 -0,900 -4,76
Workers (low qualification) -0,766 -11,81 -1,100 -4,88 -1,148 -5,12
Inactive -0,672 -4,86 -0,492 -1,16 -0,638 -1,52
Education (Omitted category: No qualifications)
Primary level 0,411 9,54 0,489 3,12 0,454 2,93
Secondary level 0,595 10,87 0,594 3,37 0,534 3,03
Baccalaureate 0,680 11,39 0,666 3,48 0,589 3,07
University degree 0,674 10,12 0,538 2,67 0,449 2,21
"Grandes écoles" 0,793 9,53 0,795 3,35 0,726 3,05
Household Type (Omitted category: Single)
Couple without children (at home) 0,222 4,83 0,227 1,58 0,175 1,23
Couple with one child (at home) -0,079 -1,40 -0,078 -0,49 -0,154 -0,97
Couple with two children (at home) -0,004 -0,06 0,067 0,41 -0,005 -0,03
Couple with three or more children (at home) -0,240 -3,57 -0,184 -1,00 -0,273 -1,48
Single parent family -0,195 -2,98 -0,516 -2,98 -0,593 -3,44
Other  0,046 0,55 0,402 1,67 0,330 1,38
Number of children living away from home -0,124 -10,43 -0,142 -3,23 -0,157 -3,61
Town Size (Omitted Category: Rural Community)
< 20 000 inhabitants -0,101 -2,17 -0,392 -2,26 -0,354 -2,07
20-100 000 inhabitants -0,154 -3,02 -0,382 -2,12 -0,354 -1,99
Over 100 000 inhabitants -0,106 -2,51 -0,429 -2,98 -0,411 -2,88
Paris Conurbation -0,267 -4,90 -0,334 -2,37 -0,307 -2,19
Paris -0,146 -1,86 -0,221 -1,21 -0,154 -0,85
Bequests received (Omitted category: Nothing) 0,553 17,26 0,655 6,88 0,612 6,48
Liquidity constraints -0,741 -15,58 -0,792 -5,92 -0,780 -5,90
Past Illness (labour force interruption) -0,279 -3,63 -0,432 -1,78 -0,385 -1,60
Short period of unemployment or illness -0,128 -3,99 0,002 0,02 0,009 0,10
Past unemployment (long period) -0,199 -3,91 -0,039 -0,28 -0,055 -0,40
Unemployed -0,192 -2,47 -0,025 -0,12 -0,038 -0,18
Risk-Aversion (continuous score) 0,013 1,66
Time preference (continuous score) -0,047 -3,27
Impatience (continuous score) 0,009 0,53
Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,060 1,97
Non-Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,023 0,78




Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
-26-
0,464 0,447 0,393
Appendix Table A1. Financial Wealth Equations (Log)
1 130 1 130 10150







































1Variables Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Household non property income (Omitted category: 1st 
decile)
2nd decile 0,187 2,45 0,398 1,61 0,364 1,49
3rd decile 0,494 6,40 0,379 1,45 0,373 1,44
4th decile 0,954 12,19 1,051 4,27 0,998 4,10
5th decile 1,102 13,92 1,259 4,99 1,171 4,69
6th decile 1,322 16,32 1,205 4,73 1,110 4,39
7th decile 1,527 18,50 1,551 6,14 1,453 5,79
8th decile 1,724 20,55 1,758 6,59 1,715 6,47
9th decile 1,815 20,95 1,879 7,02 1,760 6,62
10th decile 2,129 23,69 2,450 8,54 2,346 8,18
Age (Omitted category: under 25)
25-30 0,302 2,68 0,011 0,03 0,004 0,01
30-35 0,984 8,67 0,557 1,59 0,611 1,76
35-40 1,367 11,94 1,344 3,80 1,326 3,79
40-45 1,505 13,09 1,245 3,48 1,205 3,41
45-50 1,760 15,41 1,164 3,21 1,083 3,02
50-55 2,054 17,70 1,706 4,67 1,549 4,25
55-60 2,122 17,79 1,747 4,62 1,576 4,18
60-65 2,160 18,01 1,606 4,08 1,469 3,73
65-70 2,219 18,35 2,201 5,79 2,025 5,32
70-75 2,240 18,26 2,142 5,44 1,965 4,96
75+ 2,098 17,67 2,297 5,62 1,989 4,82
Social class of the reference person (Omitted category: 
Artisan, shopkeeper, factory owner)
Farmer 0,076 0,99 0,068 0,23 0,070 0,24
Liberal profession -0,186 -1,37 -0,174 -0,43 -0,237 -0,59
Executive -0,859 -11,58 -1,030 -4,58 -1,069 -4,81
Employee (high qualification) -1,036 -16,55 -0,962 -4,74 -0,996 -4,95
Employee (low qualification) -1,221 -19,85 -1,268 -6,27 -1,329 -6,60
Workers (high qualification) -1,192 -19,90 -1,479 -7,16 -1,514 -7,37
Workers (low qualification) -1,373 -19,94 -1,577 -6,44 -1,639 -6,73
Inactive -1,315 -8,96 -1,065 -2,31 -1,237 -2,71
Education (Omitted category: No qualifications)
Primary level 0,380 8,30 0,426 2,50 0,388 2,30
Secondary level 0,655 11,26 0,617 3,22 0,555 2,90
Baccalaureate 0,667 10,51 0,604 2,91 0,522 2,50
University degree 0,682 9,64 0,594 2,71 0,502 2,28
"Grandes écoles" 0,818 9,24 0,735 2,85 0,664 2,57
Household Type (Omitted category: Single)
Couple without children (at home) 0,438 8,99 0,146 0,94 0,088 0,57
Couple with one child (at home) 0,265 4,45 0,027 0,16 -0,060 -0,35
Couple with two children (at home) 0,472 7,61 0,247 1,38 0,166 0,93
Couple with three or more children (at home) 0,338 4,73 0,167 0,83 0,071 0,35
Single parent family -0,288 -4,15 -0,918 -4,90 -1,013 -5,43
Other  0,280 3,14 0,313 1,19 0,230 0,89
Number of children living away from home -0,104 -8,24 -0,115 -2,41 -0,132 -2,80
Town Size (Omitted Category: Rural Community)
< 20 000 inhabitants -0,261 -5,26 -0,526 -2,79 -0,480 -2,58
20-100 000 inhabitants -0,518 -9,58 -0,754 -3,85 -0,724 -3,74
Over 100 000 inhabitants -0,485 -10,80 -0,696 -4,44 -0,676 -4,37
Paris Conurbation -0,622 -10,74 -0,893 -5,82 -0,862 -5,67
Paris -0,662 -7,91 -0,877 -4,41 -0,805 -4,09
Bequests received (Omitted category: Nothing) 0,685 20,14 0,929 8,98 0,880 8,58
Liquidity constraints -0,569 -11,27 -0,613 -4,22 -0,598 -4,17
Past Illness (labour force interruption) -0,197 -2,42 -0,270 -1,02 -0,215 -0,82
Short period of unemployment or illness -0,229 -6,74 -0,134 -1,36 -0,124 -1,27
Past unemployment (long period) -0,376 -6,96 -0,259 -1,72 -0,277 -1,86
Unemployed -0,268 -3,25 0,192 0,83 0,180 0,79
Risk-Aversion (continuous score) 0,017 1,97
Time preference (continuous score) -0,047 -3,04
Impatience (continuous score) 0,008 0,43
Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,066 1,91
Non-Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,039 1,20




Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
Total Population "Experimental" Sample "Experimental" Sample
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0,506 0,543 0,557








































1Variables Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Household non property income (Omitted category: 1st decile)
2nd decile 0,220 2,96 0,520 2,13 0,498 2,07
3rd decile 0,572 7,56 0,592 2,26 0,590 2,28
4th decile 1,041 13,56 1,204 4,92 1,159 4,78
5th decile 1,209 15,56 1,254 5,04 1,181 4,80
6th decile 1,306 16,51 1,199 4,78 1,090 4,38
7th decile 1,448 18,02 1,658 6,65 1,555 6,29
8th decile 1,644 20,16 1,659 6,38 1,592 6,16
9th decile 1,740 20,66 1,834 6,99 1,706 6,55
10th decile 2,010 23,07 2,350 8,39 2,236 7,97
Age (Omitted category: under 25)
25-30 0,136 1,15 -0,260 -0,70 -0,219 -0,59
30-35 0,737 6,19 0,454 1,19 0,558 1,47
35-40 1,164 9,70 1,207 3,14 1,236 3,24
40-45 1,380 11,48 1,192 3,07 1,193 3,10
45-50 1,663 13,95 1,139 2,91 1,106 2,84
50-55 1,935 16,05 1,607 4,11 1,528 3,91
55-60 2,049 16,60 1,666 4,13 1,582 3,93
60-65 2,075 16,73 1,556 3,71 1,515 3,61
65-70 2,093 16,78 2,039 5,06 1,968 4,87
70-75 2,102 16,66 1,973 4,75 1,896 4,53
75+ 1,934 15,78 2,143 5,00 1,940 4,48
Social class of the reference person (Omitted category: Artisan, 
shopkeeper, factory owner)
Farmer 0,112 1,53 0,172 0,61 0,187 0,67
Liberal profession -0,033 -0,25 0,031 0,08 -0,007 -0,02
Executive -0,736 -10,33 -0,805 -3,66 -0,835 -3,83
Employee (high qualification) -0,956 -15,94 -0,811 -4,10 -0,824 -4,21
Employee (low qualification) -1,081 -18,22 -1,122 -5,69 -1,149 -5,83
Workers (high qualification) -1,118 -19,42 -1,339 -6,62 -1,355 -6,73
Workers (low qualification) -1,305 -19,60 -1,425 -5,86 -1,451 -5,99
Inactive -1,326 -9,09 -1,041 -2,23 -1,142 -2,47
Education (Omitted category: No qualifications)
Primary level 0,360 8,03 0,395 2,33 0,342 2,03
Secondary level 0,555 9,71 0,507 2,65 0,427 2,23
Baccalaureate 0,586 9,45 0,526 2,53 0,428 2,05
University degree 0,599 8,67 0,649 2,95 0,534 2,42
"Grandes écoles" 0,703 8,21 0,634 2,48 0,537 2,09
Household Type (Omitted category: Single)
Couple without children (at home) 0,425 8,99 0,148 0,95 0,102 0,66
Couple with one child (at home) 0,232 3,97 0,118 0,69 0,049 0,29
Couple with two children (at home) 0,408 6,71 0,133 0,75 0,067 0,38
Couple with three or more children (at home) 0,262 3,69 0,060 0,29 -0,007 -0,04
Single parent family -0,287 -4,20 -0,925 -4,86 -1,005 -5,30
Other  0,240 2,80 0,207 0,81 0,128 0,51
Number of children living away from home -0,097 -7,94 -0,083 -1,76 -0,099 -2,13
Town Size (Omitted Category: Rural Community)
< 20 000 inhabitants -0,237 -4,95 -0,512 -2,77 -0,461 -2,52
20-100 000 inhabitants -0,429 -8,15 -0,583 -2,97 -0,543 -2,80
Over 100 000 inhabitants -0,397 -9,13 -0,590 -3,83 -0,567 -3,73
Paris Conurbation -0,481 -8,50 -0,761 -5,03 -0,734 -4,90
Paris -0,486 -5,95 -0,606 -3,08 -0,548 -2,81
Bequests received (Omitted category: Nothing) 0,683 20,91 0,891 8,82 0,839 8,38
Liquidity constraints -0,440 -8,59 -0,448 -2,99 -0,440 -2,96
Past Illness (labour force interruption) -0,236 -3,01 -0,264 -1,02 -0,234 -0,91
Short period of unemployment or illness -0,217 -6,54 -0,175 -1,78 -0,158 -1,61
Past unemployment (long period) -0,278 -5,17 -0,186 -1,23 -0,197 -1,32
Unemployed -0,257 -3,12 0,019 0,09 -0,008 -0,04
Risk-Aversion (continuous score) 0,013 1,67
Time preference (continuous score) -0,037 -2,39
Impatience (continuous score) 0,021 1,13
Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,086 2,51
Non-Family Altruism (continuous score) 0,036 1,13




Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
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Appendix Table A3. Net Wealth Equations (Log)
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1 Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Risk Aversion (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0,164 1,43 0,178 1,43 0,153 1,23
High (Top 25%) 0.226* 1,66 0.412** 2,56 0.238* 1,70
Time Preference (Ref: Top 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0.249*** 3,93 0.486*** 3,98 0.379*** 3,09
Low (Lowest 25%) 0.609** 2,21 0.614*** 3,65 0.525*** 3,14
Impatience (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0,059 0,60 0,066 0,62 0,167 1,60
High (Top 25%) 0,015 0,11 0,082 0,55 0,151 1,01
Family Altruism (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0,157 1,46 0,142 1,22 0.280** 2,41
High (Top 25%) 0.308** 2,24 0.277* 1,87 0.381*** 2,60
Non-Family Altruism (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) -0,045 -0,48 -0,025 -0,24 0,002 0,02
High (Top 25%) -0,055 -0,37 0,050 0,32 -0,042 -0,27
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
Note: The other right-hand side variables are detailed in the Appendix Tables.
The table should be read as follows . Belonging to the top quartile of far-sighted households has a positive effect on gross wealth (with a coefficient of 0.614, significant at the 5% level).
Variables
1 Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Risk Aversion (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0,060 0,59 -0,097 -0,88 -0,037 -0,34
High (Top 25%) -0,061 -0,45 -0,012 -0,08 0,008 0,06
Time Preference (Ref: Top 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) 0.277*** 2,62 0.274* 2,39 0.238** 2,08
Low (Lowest 25%) 0.350*** 2,90 0.541*** 4,14 0.436*** 3,38
Impatience (Ref: lowest 25%)
Medium (Middle 50%) -0,051 -0,48 -0,094 -0,81 -0,057 -0,50
High (Top 25%) 0,034 0,27 0,059 0,43 0,091 0,68
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
The table should be read as follows . Belonging to the top quartile of forward-looking households has a positive effect on gross wealth (with a coefficient of 0.541, significant at the 5% level).
Note: 1) As  we do not have a scale for the altruism scores, we introduce scores as regressors, so as to compare with Table 1. The other right-hand side variables are detailed in the Appendix Tables.
Table 2. Wealth Regressions with Scales
Log Financial Wealth Log Gross Wealth Log Net Wealth
Log Financial Wealth Log Gross Wealth








































1Variables Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Risk Aversion (Ref: CRRA>3.76)
No Reply -0,218*** -2,74 -0,169*** -2,30 -0,147** -2,08
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,139* 1,92 0,048 0,72 0,037 0,57
1=<CRRA<2 0,158 1,46 -0,062 -0,62 -0,001 -0,01
CRRA<1 0,159 1,15 -0,136 -1,07 -0,120 -0,97
Number of Observations
Variables Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic Coefficient T-statistic
Risk Aversion (Ref: CRRA>3.76)
No Reply 0,151 0,62 0,122 0,50 0,064 0,27
2=<CRRA<3.76 0,104 0,59 0,136 0,78 0,092 0,53
1=<CRRA<2 -0,067 -0,26 0,015 0,06 -0,112 -0,45
CRRA<1 0,468 1,47 0,094 0,30 0,081 0,26
Risk aversion score 0,013 1,09 0,023** 2,01 0,015* 1,68
Number of Observations
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
Table 3. Wealth Regressions (Lotterys vs. Scores)
423 423 423
2944
b) Recto-verso questionnaire and "experimental" sub-sample 
The table should be read as follows . A value of risk-aversion under 1 is positively correlated with financial wealth (with coefficients of 0.159 in the Recto-Verso questionnaire
and 0.468 in the "experimental" sub-sample). However, these correlations are not statistically significant.
2944 2944
a) Recto-verso questionnaire
Log Gross Wealth Log Net Wealth








































1Saver Types Financial Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth
Quartile Scores (1st and 4th quartiles)
1
Risk-loving (ref.) 87 83 87
Risk-averse 109* 125*** 110*
Short-sighted (ref.) 66 63 68
Farsighted 121*** 116*** 114***
Impatient (ref.) n.s n.s n.s
Patient n.s n.s n.s
Family egoist (ref.) 87 88 80
Family altruist 118** 116** 117***
Non-Family egoist (ref.) n.s n.s n.s
Non-Family altruist n.s n.s n.s
Continuous Scores (max and min)
2
Risk-loving (ref.) 72 64 70
Risk-averse 137* 151** 138*
Short-sighted (ref.) 45 44 53
Farsighted 158*** 159*** 144**
Impatient (ref.) n.s n.s n.s.
Patient n.s n.s n.s.
Family egoist (ref.) 68 65 58
Family altruist 124** 127** 136**
Non-Family egoist (ref.) n.s n.s n.s.
Non-Family altruist n.s n.s n.s.
Average 100 100 100
Table 4. Risk-Attitude, Time Preference and Wealth
Notes: 1) Estimated wealth corresponds to the regressions in Table 1.
The table should be read as follows . The average household in the sample holds wealth normalised to 100. 
The farsighted hold 84% more gross wealth than the short-sighted the reference category. This difference is
statistically significant at the one per cent level.
          2) Estimated wealth corresponds to the regressions in Appendix Tables A1 to A3.








































1Current non property income 0,200 0,206 0,224
Age 0,174 0,200 0,196
Social Class 0,169 0,194 0,190
Bequests Received (dummy) 0,147 0,176 0,177
Preferences (risk-aversion, time 
preference, family altruism)
0,128 0,127 0,120
Household Type (marital status, number 
of children)
0,126 0,142 0,131
Town Size 0,076 0,121 0,107
Liquidity Constrained (dummy) 0,133 0,085 0,087





2 0,463 0,559 0,559
Number of observations 1 129 1 131 1 051
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
The table should be read as follows . The partial correlation coefficient of preferences with gross wealth
is 0.127. This correlation is calculated from regressions including the other control variables.
Table 5a. Ranking of Partial R
2 Coefficients in Wealth Regressions
Financial 








































Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth Financial 
Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth
Current non property income (in deciles) 16,0 18,0 15,3 11,8 20,7 18,2
Age (12 levels) 8,1 13,1 13,7 15,1 17,4 19,2
Income*Age (24 levels) 22,0 24,6 24,1 24,8 28,8 30,2
Social Class (10 levels) 17,9 27,5 26,0 16,7 28,5 27,1
Bequests Received (dummy) 9,5 11,8 12,2 14,9 16,9 17,3
Bequests (Amount: 4 levels) 15,1 19,5 20,1 22,1 24,2 24,8
Preferences (Risk-aversion-Time 
preference-Family altruism: 21 levels)
7,6 10,2 10,4
Parents' Social Class (9 levels) 7,6 7,2 7,1 8,4 7,3 7,7
Education (6 levels) 8,6 7,5 6,8 7,5 5,1 5,2
Household Type (7 levels) 3,7 7,4 6,6 3,0 5,3 4,2
Town Size (6 levels) 4,0 3,1 3,2 7,3 3,6 3,9
Liquidity Constrained (dummy) 3,5 1,7 1,4 2,9 1,7 1,2
Employment interruptions (unemployment, 
health: 4 levels)
3,6 5,9 5,3 3,1 4,5 4,7
Wealth Gains or Losses (4 levels) 6,4 6,5 5,9 8,1 12,5 11,2
Theil 1,25 0,76 0,79 1,32 0,82 0,82
Number of observations
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Note : 1) Population of Households whose Reference Person (Male) is Salaried.
1 135
The table should be read as follows . The preference parameters explain 10.2% of the gross wealth distribution, as measured by the Theil
Index in the "experimental" (unweighted) sample.
Table 5b. Decomposition of Wealth inequality (in %): Theil Index
Variables









































Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth Financial 
Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth
Current non property income (in deciles) 18,6 27,6 23,9 27,1 36,0 33,4
Permanent Income (in deciles) 12,7 17,4 14,4 15,1 20,0 18,2
Age (12 levels) 10,9 14,7 16,6 28,8 29,5 29,5
Permanent Income*age (24 levels) 24,5 32,8 32,6 45,1 47,3 50,0
Social Class (10 levels) 17,4 20,2 19,6 22,4 24,1 25,1
Bequests Received (dummy) 8,8 12,0 12,7 13,8 17,7 18,0
Bequests (Amount: 4 levels) 15,3 19,9 21,0 22,4 27,9 28,2
Preferences (Risk-aversion-Time 
preference-Family altruism: 21 levels)
16,3 15,6 17,1
Parents' Social Class (9 levels) 9,4 7,8 7,8 10,4 8,9 8,5
Education (6 levels) 11,5 11,8 10,8 11,7 11,5 11,8
Household Type (7 levels) 2,9 3,9 4,0 6,1 2,1 2,9
Town Size (6 levels) 3,6 2,4 2,9 7,2 4,9 5,6
Liquidity Constrained (dummy) 4,0 3,8 3,2 3,2 2,8 1,8
Employment interruptions (unemployment, 
health: 4 levels)
4,4 4,7 4,0 4,0 4,4 4,7
Wealth Gains or Losses (4 levels) 5,3 5,9 5,4 5,0 8,6 7,3
Theil 1,14 0,60 0,62 1,10 0,66 0,66
Number of observations
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Note : 1) Population of Households whose Reference Person (Male) is Salaried.
The table should be read as follows. The preference parameters explain 15.6% of the gross wealth distribution, as measured by the Theil
Index in the "experimental" (unweighted) sample.
5 808 693











































1Sample Aged 50-65 Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong
A/YP<2 470 60 19,0 60,3 20,7 25,8 48,3 25,9 50,0 34,5 15,5
Other 665 208 12,4 55,2 32,4 44,7 44,3 11,0 21,0 50,4 28,6
Total 1135 268 13,8 56,3 29,9 40,7 45,1 14,2 27,2 47,0 25,8
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Table 6. Adequacy of saving and Individual Preferences
N
Risk-Aversion
Note: The Weak and Strong categories correspond to the lowest and highest quartile of the distribution of scores in the total
population. The medium category corresponds to the middle quartiles. The two distributions are significantly different at the
1% level for time preference and family altruism. They are not are significantly different for risk-aversion. Permanent income,
YP , is predicted from an earnings equation using household characteristics.
The table should be read as follows . Households with a reference person aged between 50 and 65 and with A/YP<2 are
more than twice as likely to belong to the most short-sighted quartile of households (25.9%) as are other households (11.0%).
Time Preference Family Altruism Saver 
Types
















































Weak  Family 
Altruism
Weak Risk-Aversion 1,00 -0,34 -0,10 0,05 0,14
Weak Time Preference 1,00 0,12 -0,30 -0,38
Low Impatience 1,00 0,05 0,12
Weak Non-Family Altruism 1,00 0,25
Weak  Family Altruism 1,00







Weak Risk-Aversion 1,00 -0,17 -0,21
Weak Time Preference 1,00 0,12
Low Impatience 1,00










Weak  Family 
Altruism
Weak Risk-Aversion 1,00 -0,20 -0,05 0,01 0,07
Weak Time Preference 1,00 0,09 -0,19 -0,25
Low Impatience 1,00 0,01 0,08
Weak Non-Family Altruism 1,00 0,15
Weak  Family Altruism 1,00
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
The table should be read as follows . The correlation between the time preference score and risk-aversion, -0.20, is calculated
using questions which are allocated to one measure only. If we use all of the questions, the correlation is -0.32.
Scores (rank correlation)
Note: Significant correlations at the 5% level are shown in bold. 
Table 7. Correlations Between Risk and Time Preferences
Scales
The table should be read as follows . The weighted correlation between the time preference score and risk-aversion, -0.34, is
calculated using questions which are allocated to one measure only. If we use all of the questions, the correlation is -0.50.
Scores
Note: Significant correlations at the 5% level are shown in bold. 









































Weak 1,6 13,2 9,1 23,9
Medium 10,7 29,8 11,1 51,6
Strong 12,0 10,3 2,2 24,5
Total 24,3 53,3 22,4 100,0
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Risk-Aversion
Time Preference
Weak 4,7 15,7 7,2 27,6
Medium 8,6 30,8 7,1 46,5
Strong 8,7 13,0 4,2 25,9
Total 22,0 59,5 18,5 100,0
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey
Scales (correlation = -0.20)
Weak Strong Medium Total
The Table should be read as follows. 1.6% of the population belong to the first quartile of both the risk-
aversion and time preference distributions.
Note: The Weak and Strong categories correspond to the lowest and highest quartile of the distribution of
scores in the total population. The medium category corresponds to  the middle quartiles.
Table 8. Distribution of the population according to risk-aversion and time-preference
Scores (correlation = -0.34)







































1Variables Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Risk-Aversion and Time Preference (Omitted category: Risk-
loving and Short-sighted)
Risk-loving and medium or strong foresight 0,114 0,650 0.353* 1,850 0,269 1,420
Medium risk-aversion and strong foresight 0.529*** 2,890 0.559*** 2,810 0.495*** 2,510
Risk-averse and strong foresight 0.596*** 2,930 0.646*** 2,920 0.441** 2,040
Medium risk-aversion and medium foresight 0.267* 1,750 0.453*** 2,720 0.415*** 2,500
Medium risk-aversion and short-sighted 0,012 0,070 0,128 0,650 -0,034 -0,170
Risk-averse and medium foresight or short-sighted 0,189 1,030 0.581*** 2,920 0.370* 1,870
Impatience (Omitted category:  Lowest quartile)
Medium (two middle quartiles) 0,049 0,500 0,038 0,360 0,153 1,470
Strong (Top quartile) -0,009 -0,070 0,052 0,350 0,132 0,890
Family altruism (Omitted category:  Lowest quartile)
Medium (two middle quartiles) 0,170 1,590 0,162 1,390 0.290*** 2,500
Strong (Top quartile) 0.296** 2,140 0.305** 2,020 0.388*** 2,620
Non-Family altruism (Omitted category:  Lowest quartile)
Medium (two middle quartiles) -0,048 -0,500 -0,013 -0,130 0,000 0,000
Strong (Top quartile) -0,050 -0,340 0,063 0,400 -0,043 -0,270
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance level, respectively.
The table should be read as follows . Being risk-averse with strong foresight is positively correlated with gross wealth. This effect (0.596) is significant at the 1% level.
Log Financial Wealth Log Net Wealth








































1Saver Types Financial Wealth Gross Wealth Net Wealth
Continuous Scores (max. and min.)
1
Short-sighted and Risk-loving 73*** 20*** 21**
Short-sighted and Risk-averse 25*** 96*** 133**
Farsighted and Risk-loving 73*** 126*** 143**
Farsighted and Risk-averse 369*** 193*** 139**
Quartile Scores (7 levels)
2
Short-sighted and Risk-loving  (Reference) 78 67 74
Risk-loving and medium or strong foresight 88 95* 96
Medium risk-aversion and strong foresight 133*** 117*** 121***
Risk-averse and strong foresight 142*** 128*** 114**
Medium risk-aversion and medium foresight 102* 105*** 111***
Medium risk-aversion and short-sighted 79 76 71
Risk-averse and medium foresight or short-sighted 94 120*** 106*
Mean 100 100 100
Table 10. Preference Attitudes and Wealth (interaction effects)
Notes: 1) The significance of the coefficients concerns the simultaneous test of the three estimators: risk-aversion,
time preference, and interaction.
           2) Estimated wealth levels correspond to the estimates in Table 2.
The table should be read as follows . The average household in the sample has wealth normalised to 100. Those
who are farsighted and risk-averse hold 91% more gross wealth (128/67) than those who are short-sighted and risk-
loving (the omitted category). The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Source: INSEE Patrimoine 1997 Survey. ***, **, *: Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance 
level, respectively.
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